

# **Cyber-Threat in Securities Markets**

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# Content

- I. The cyber-threat to the financial system: tackling the myths
- II. Case study: the world's exchanges
- III. Measures and responses



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# What is cyber-crime?

Cyber-crime is a <u>harmful activity</u> executed through computers, IT systems and/or the internet and targeting the **confidentiality**, **integrity and accessibility** of computer systems, IT infrastructures and/or internet presence.

It can include:

- *traditional crimes* e.g. fraud, forgery executed over the internet;
- publication of *harmful information* via electronic media;
- specifically *internet-based crimes* e.g. denial of service, hacking;
- and 'platform crimes' which use computer and information systems as a platform for performing other crimes e.g. use of botnets to control another user's computer.



# What is cyber-crime?

The evolving nature of cyber-crime

- As society and our securities markets *rely increasingly on cyber-infrastructure*, the potential reach of cyber-crime expands.
- Currently most households and businesses are *online* and there is increasing use of *social media* for financial purposes.





#### Myth #1:

# Perpetrators of cyber-crime in the financial system are simply criminals looking for financial gain







### Motives

- Thieves/fraudsters looking for *financial gain*.
- 'Hactivists', motivated by a *political ideal or ideology*.
- Cyber spies, stealing *political or economic secrets* from firms and nations.
- Nation states or terrorist groups, using the cyber vector to *disrupt or destroy*.
- Insiders seeking to *steal or sabotage*.
- Individuals looking to *wreak havoc for fun*.



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#### Targets

Money

Information

**Critical systems** 



#### Myth #2: Cyber-crime is a passing nuisance









# ... a growing threat

- Potential to reap massive reputational damage across whole sectors
- *Debilitating effects* on market availability and integrity.
- A potential *systemic* risk.

"This is a rapidly rising area of risk with potentially systemic implications."

-- Andrew Haldane, executive director of financial stability at the BoE



#### Myth #3: Cyber-crime is an IT issue







#### Vulnerabilities





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# Cyber-crime and systemic risk

See report 'Cyber-crime, Securities Markets and Systemic Risk': <u>www.iosco.org/research</u>

- Impact factors to inform analysis:
  - Size of the threat
  - Complexity
  - Incentive structure
  - Effect on market integrity and efficiency
  - Infiltration of non-substitutable and/or interconnected services
  - Transparency and awareness
  - Level of cyber-security and cyber-resilience
  - Effectiveness of existing regulation



# Case study: the world's exchanges

#### Size of the threat, complexity of attacks

- *53% of exchanges* reported suffering a cyber-attack(s) in 2012.
- A mix of *simplistic* (e.g. DDOS) and *sophisticated* (e.g. malicious code) attacks.

# Motive, effect on market integrity and efficiency, attacks on non-substitutable and/or interconnected services

- Majority of attacks *disruptive* in nature.
- Attacks against exchanges which are non-substitutable infrastructure and heavily interconnected.
- *No impact* on market integrity and efficiency.... *yet*.



# Case study: the world's exchanges

#### **Transparency and awareness**

- 93% of exchanges report that cyber-crime is generally understood and discussed by *senior management*
- 89% of exchanges report having a *formal plan/documentation* addressing cyber-threats
- 70% of exchanges *share information* with authorities, regulators and other actors on a *national* basis.



# Case study: the world's exchanges

Level of cyber-security and cyber-resilience

- All exchanges have *detection and prevention* measures in place.
- 94% have *disaster recovery* measures in place for cyber-attacks.
- 85% of exchanges have *training* for general staff
- 89% of exchanges report having a *formal plan/documentation* addressing cyber-threats
- 70% of exchanges *share information* with authorities, regulators and other actors on a *national* basis.
- General perception that a large-scale attack with potential for widespread damage will eventually *breach*.
- 22% have cyber-crime *insurance* or something similar.



# Case study: the world's exchanges

Effectiveness of existing regulation

- 59% report *sanction regimes* in place for cyber-crime
- Of these only half suggesting these are *effective in deterring* cyber-criminals.
- Doubt due to *cross-jurisdictional nature* of cyber-crime and issue of attribution.



# Case study: the world's exchanges

A systemic risk?

89% of exchanges view cyber-crime as a systemic risk.

- *Halting* trading activity or *affecting* the ability of a clearing house to act as a central counter party within the settlement window
- *Moving markets* through takeover of accounts and unauthorized trading
- *Targeting* telecommunication networks supporting financial structures
- Ongoing *data manipulation* and compromise of financial data integrity
- *Leaking of insider information* on an ongoing basis
- Attacking multiple, interconnected financial actors in different jurisdictions simultaneously



# Case study: the world's exchanges

Conclusions:

Cyber-crime:

- Threathens the orderly and efficient markets;
- Is a truly global problem;
- Is growing in size, sophistication, potential for disruption and destruction;
- And therefore a potential systemic risk.





# "This is a rapidly rising area of risk with potentially systemic implications."

-- Andrew Haldane, executive director of financial stability at the BoE

"It's a big deal; it's going to get worse"

-- Jamie Dimon, CEO of JP Morgan

"The financial services industry is one of the more attractive targets for cyberattacks, and, unfortunately, the threat is growing" -- Thomas Curry

"This issue has emerged as arguably the top systemic threat, facing not only the global financial markets and associated infrastructures, but also world governments and military establishments." -- DTCC, Beyond the Horizon White Paper, Aug 2013

"Will the next systemic shock spring from a liquidity crunch or inherent capital weakness... or is it more likely to come from an as yet unforeseen event or network of events such as a massive payment outage or a new breed of cyber attack?"



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# Measures and Response

IOSCO Board appointed a cyber-coordinator on cyber-resilience:

- Committee 2 is considering cyber-crime under its mandate for work on the 'Robustness of Electronic Trading Systems and Markets'.
- Committee 3 is considering cyber-crime under its mandate for work on 'Business Continuity for intermediaries'.
- Committee 4 is considering information exchange on cyber-attacks, determined MMoU is apt for use.
- Affiliate Members Consultative Committee is preparing a report on a survey among its members.
- CPMI-IOSCO Committee created to deliver guidance/principles on cyber resilience.